The ability of the Japanese stock market to appropriately price the riskiness of Japanese financial firms has been frequently questioned, particularly in light of Japan's widespread financial distress in recent years and poor disclosure requirements. This paper examines the response in equity returns of Japanese banks to the failure of four commercial banks and two securities firms between 1995 and 1998. Using event study methodology, the analysis finds that share prices of surviving banks on the whole responded unfavorably to the failures and that financially weaker survivors were more adversely affected. This suggests that, despite the distress and alleged opaqueness, bank shareholders were able to use available indicators of financial condition both to incorporate new information quickly into stock prices and to differentiate among banks.
At the same time, however, studies have questioned the ability of the Japanese stock market to incorporate new information in stock prices equally quickly or to differentiate the impact among firms. This skepticism has been particularly strong for Japanese banks and other financial institutions that have experienced more serious and longer lasting financial difficulties than their U.S. counterparts have and for whom available financial data are perceived to be far less complete, available, or timely.
2 For instance, Japanese banks did not report the amount of nonperforming loans in their portfolios until 1993, and it was not until 1998 that they reported such loans consistent with U.S. standards. Hence, Japan provides a good test of how well investors incorporate new information potentially affecting bank performance in bank stock prices in a country with relatively poor financial transparency.
In addition to relying on reported accounting data, market participants may infer the existence of problems at a given bank from information on financial distress at other banks or financial institutions with similar lines of business (e.g., securities firms). An announcement of distress and particularly of failure may provide insights into the financial condition of banks competing in the same banking market or with similar asset holdings or customer bases. Such announcements may also cause a more pessimistic outlook for the entire industry and increase risk perceptions and funding costs. In addition, because Japanese bank regulators have often changed their policy toward failing banks, failure announcements could transmit signals to investors about potential responses by the regulators to future bank insolvencies.
To assess the impact of the failure of Japanese financial institutions on the market value of surviving banks, we examine the responses to financial distress at six important institutions-four commercial banks and two securities firms-between 1995 and 1998, using stock returns and standard event-study methodology. We examine the impact of these failures on the industry as a whole and any differential impact on individual surviving banks based on their financial characteristics, perceived commonality by investors, and financial linkages with the failed institutions or their affiliated group. The empirical findings in this paper indicate that the failures were perceived to be bad news for other banks as a whole and worse news for banks in weaker financial condition. On average, the abnormal stock returns for the surviving banks, computed around each of the six failure announcements, were negative, significantly different from zero, and varied inversely with the financial condition of individual banks. This suggests that despite the relative opaqueness and regulatory distortions, Japanese stock market participants were able both to incorporate new information relatively quickly and to differentiate among banks, so that any contagion from the failures to other banks was rational and information based.
These results are consistent with other recent evidence reported in the literature that the prices of debt and equity instruments are sensitive to differences in risk of failure among Japanese financial institutions. Peek and Rosengren (2001) found that the interest rates charged large Japanese banks in the international interbank loan markets (the so-called Japanese premium) responded in the expected direction to a number of adverse financial and regulatory events, including the failures of Japanese financial institutions. Bremer and Pettway (2002) found that the Japanese stock market anticipated the rating downgrades of Japanese banks. Chiou (1999) reported that Japanese affiliates of Daiwa Bank suffered negative excess returns following the announcement of Daiwa's trading scandal in 1995. Kang and Stulz (2000) found that Japanese firms that were more dependent on Japanese bank loans performed relatively better when their banks were doing well in the 1980s and more poorly when their banks were performing poorly in the 1990s after the bubble in asset prices collapsed. Yamori (1999) reported that the failure of the Hyogo Bank in 1995 had a negative impact on the excess returns of the banking industry and, in particular, of banks in weaker financial condition. Most recently, Spiegel and Yamori (2000) examined the behavior of stock market returns of Japanese banks in response to the regulatory closure of a large number of financial institutions over the 1995-1998 period. They found that market participants perceived that the legal closure of a financial institution in a class of banks that had not previously experienced closure increased the probability that more banks in that class would be closed.
We expand on these studies by testing a number of specific and, at times, conflicting hypotheses describing the potential impact of bank failures on other banks and relating the responses of the surviving banks to their financial and other bankspecific characteristics. As a result, we gain more complete information on the ability of Japanese investors to incorporate new information into the prices of bank equity securities.
The remainder of the paper contains six sections and two appendices. The first section describes the four major hypotheses tested. The second section identifies the six institutions that failed. The third section describes our methodology and empirical tests. The fourth section describes the data. The fifth section reports the empirical results for both the banking industry as a whole and for individual banks. The sixth section summarizes the findings and offers conclusions.
THE HYPOTHESES
We test four hypotheses about the impact of the failure of Japanese financial institutions on surviving Japanese banks: (1) the irrelevance hypothesis, (2) the positive revaluation hypothesis, (3) the negative revaluation hypothesis, and (4) the pure or noninformational contagion hypothesis.
The Irrelevance Hypothesis
Under the irrelevance hypothesis, failure events have no significant impact on the share prices of surviving banks. This may occur because (1) the announcements revealed new information for the values of surviving banks but shareholders did not, or could not, fully incorporate the information into share prices in a timely manner due to market inefficiency, (2) the failures were fully anticipated by market participants and provided no new information, or (3) the causes of the failures and the regulators' response to the insolvencies were perceived to be idiosyncratic and not relevant to the surviving institutions.
The Positive Revaluation Hypothesis
Under the positive revaluation hypothesis, investors perceive the failures as positive news for the industry as a whole, generating positive abnormal returns for the surviving banks. This would occur if uncertainty regarding the condition of the banking system or the regulators' failure to resolve insolvencies before the failures imposed costs on surviving banks. Thus, the resolution of the uncertainty or a stronger regulatory posture removes these costs. Peek and Rosengren (2001) provide evidence that, by increasing the probability that weak institutions would be closed, resolution of regulatory uncertainty reduced the interest rate that large Japanese banks were charged in international interbank markets. A positive reaction to the failures examined in this paper could also occur if the resolution of insolvencies implied that the financially stronger banks in Japan would no longer be called upon by the regulators to assist the weaker institutions, as they had been in the past under the "convoy system" of rescue. Lastly, the exit by failure of weak firms may also improve the competitive conditions for surviving banks, increasing their earnings and share prices (Lang and Stulz, 1992, Kaufman, 1994 ).
The Negative Revaluation Hypothesis
Under the negative revaluation hypothesis, the failure announcements have a significant negative impact on the share prices of surviving banks by signaling higher operating and regulatory costs. The failures could have revealed previously undisclosed or understated problems in the banking system. In addition, banks that were perceived to be similarly insolvent could be seen as the next victims of the regulatory failure resolution process or could face increased surveillance and various regulatory actions to restrict their activities (Grammatikos and Saunders 1990 ).
The Pure or Noninformational Contagion Hypothesis
Under the pure contagion or noninformational contagion hypothesis, investors perceive the failure to affect all surviving bank stocks similarly, regardless of differences in the financial condition or other characteristics of the individual banks. The ability of the market to differentiate among banks is affected by the quality and timeliness of the information that is publicly disclosed about these institutions. The less accurate, precise, or timely the information, the less likely are security prices to fully reflect the actual financial and risk characteristics of the individual banks. In such environments, even if the failures revealed new information and had a significant impact on the banking sector as a whole, their impact on individual bank share prices will not be correlated with the reported condition of the banks.
In contrast, if accurate and timely information were available, investors could assess the relevance of the failure announcements to the operation of individual banks. The responses of shareholders would then be related to financial and other characteristics of the surviving banks and be inconsistent with the noninformational hypothesis. For example, if the failures increased the likelihood that regulators would allow weak institutions to fail without relying on financial support from stronger banks or revealed previously undisclosed problems in certain sectors of the economy, one would expect banks in weaker financial condition or with greater exposures to the problem institutions to be more adversely affected.
THE FAILURES EXAMINED
We examine the market response to six important failures of Japanese financial institutions between 1995 and 1998. These failures may be expected to have signaled new and meaningful information about the financial state or health of the Japanese banking system and the attitude of Japanese bank regulators. Four of the failures were commercial banks-the Hyogo Bank on August 30, 1995, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank on November 17, 1997, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) on October 23, 1998, and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) on December 13, 1998. The other two failures were securities firms-Sanyo Securities and Yamaichi Securities, on November 4 and 25, 1997, respectively. 3 In brief, Hyogo was the first sizable bank failed and liquidated by Japanese regulators since the end of World War II. For the first time, losses were imposed on both the bank's shareholders and some of its large creditors. Hokkaido was the first large bank so resolved, and LTCB and NCB were among the largest and most visible Japanese banks. The resolution of these banks may be expected to alter bank shareholders' perceptions about the use of "too-big-to-fail" policies by Japanese regulators. The two securities firms were selected because they, like major Japanese banks, funded themselves in the shortterm money markets and invested a significant proportion of their assets in similar securities. Thus, a securities firm default in the short-term money markets could reveal negative information about the quality of commercial bank investment portfolios and create funding difficulties for commercial banks. These failures were not only significant per se, but also signaled possible significant changes in the attitude of the Japanese bank regulatory agencies to impose sanctions on troubled institutions and losses on stakeholders of legally insolvent institutions.
METHODOLOGY
Our empirical analysis is conducted in three parts. The first part examines the stock market returns of the failed institutions before failure to determine if market participants anticipated their subsequent failure. If the reported financial condition and stock market performance of the failed institutions prior to failure were noticeably worse than those of their competitors, then it is more likely that the failure announcements were anticipated and there would have been no significant market reaction to the announcement events. However, even if investors fully anticipated the insolvency of any of the six institutions, the failures could still have affected the valuation of surviving banks by signaling a change in the regulatory resolution process. In addition, in four of the six failures, the shareholders were not wiped out completely and shares of the failed institutions continued to trade after their legal failure. Thus, we can also examine the reaction of the shareholders of these failed institutions to their own failure announcement. 4 In the second part, we focus on the responses of the surviving banks to the failure event without concern about the financial condition of the survivors. Our methodology closely follows the event study widely used in previous papers examining the response of stock prices to changes in the regulatory environment and announcements (e.g., Binder, 1998 , MacKinlay, 1997 . Specifically, the daily stock returns of surviving banks are examined to identify any abnormal performance on or around the announcement of the six failure events. The impact of the events is measured by estimating a standard multivariate regression model, similar to that used by Binder (1988) , Karafiath, Mynatt, and Smith (1991) , Malatesta (1986) , Millon-Cornett and Tehranian (1990) , and Schipper and Thompson (1983) , among others. The model takes the following form:
where R it is the stock return of bank i on day t; α i is the intercept coefficient for bank i; R mt is the market index for day t; β i is the market risk coefficient for bank i; D k is a binary variable that equals 1 if day t is equal to the event day or window k (k ʦ [0,ϩ1]), zero otherwise; γ ik is the event coefficient for bank i; and ε it is a random error. Thus, the estimated parameters γ ik capture any daily intercept shifts on event day (window) k and provide an estimate of abnormal (excess or unexpected) returns associated with the failure announcement on day (window) k. Equation (1) is estimated as a system of separate equations for the individual banks in the sample using generalized least squares (GLS). To permit the impact of the events examined and the variance of the residuals to vary across banks, individual equations are estimated for each bank rather than estimating one equation for a portfolio of all banks.
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The values of the parameters in Equation (1) are estimated using daily data before and after each event date over an observation period sufficiently long to obtain meaningful results but one short enough not to be affected by the other events examined in the study. However, because the three events in 1997 and the two events in 1998 are reasonably close to one another, we use common estimation periods in each of these years. To reduce the effects of specific events on subsequent events in the common estimation period, Equation (1) is modified so as to permit a shift in both the intercept (α) and the market index coefficient (β) after the first failure in each estimation period as follows (Binder and Norton 1999) 6 :
where e is the number of events in 1997 (e ϭ 3) or 1998 (e ϭ 2), and P is a binary variable that identifies postevent periods, i.e., P is equal to 1 after the first event window within each estimation period. For the 1997 estimation period, P is equal to 1 for the period after the failure of Sanyo Securities, zero otherwise, and for the 1998 estimation period, it is equal to 1 after the LTCB failure, zero otherwise. Each estimation period stretches from 186 trading days before the first event date in each year to 20 trading days after the last event date. The length of these sample periods conforms closely to those used in previous studies (e.g., MacKinlay, 1997, Smirlock and Kaufold, 1987) . This results in a 208 trading day estimation period for the Hyogo Bank failure in 1995 (including the two-day event window), a 222 day estimation period for the three failures in 1997, and a 246 trading day period for the two failures in 1998.
We examine the individual banks' estimated daily abnormal returns-γ ik -for each event. If the impact of the failures were consistent with the positive revaluation hypothesis and had unanticipated positive implications for the banking industry by weeding out the weak institutions and reducing competition, we would expect the abnormal returns during the event window to be positive and statistically significant. If the impact of the events were consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis and revealed previously unanticipated adverse news for the banking industry by indicating greater weakness or risk of more timely regulatory closure, we would expect the individual bank reactions to be significantly negative. If the impact of the events were consistent with the irrelevance hypothesis and revealed no new information or were considered irrelevant by the shareholders of surviving banks, the abnormal returns would be statistically indistinguishable from zero. To distinguish among these alternative scenarios, we test the hypothesis H 1 0 that the individual abnormal returns are jointly equal to zero for each event e and the hypothesis H 2 0 that the abnormal returns are jointly equal to each other, i.e.,
For each hypothesis test, we compute the standard asymptotic χ 2 test statistic and the small sample F-statistic. In addition, we examine the cross-sectional median of abnormal returns and test the hypothesis that the number of banks with positive abnormal returns is greater than 50% of the sample. A rejection of this hypothesis would be consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis.
Some surviving banks are likely to have had extensive relationships with the failed institutions through group affiliations, as is common in Japan. These cross-firm links include extensive cross-shareholdings, significant credit exposures to group companies, implicit and explicit financial guarantees, and intricate customer relationships. This could influence how their shareholders reacted to the six announcements. We test for the existence of such effects. If banks that were shareholders in the failed institutions were affected more adversely by the six failures than were other banks, we would expect the average abnormal returns for these "investor" banks to be significantly lower than the average abnormal returns for the "non-shareholder" banks.
Lastly, the responses of the shareholders of the individual surviving banks could also differ according to similarities between the operations of the failed and surviving institutions. In this regard, Japanese banks are often classified into four types-city banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, and regional banks-according to their size, composition of assets and loans, customer base, funding sources, and regulatory requirements and treatment. 7 We test for statistical differences among these classifications.
In the third part of our analysis, we explore the pure or noninformational contagion hypothesis to test whether there is evidence of cross-sectional variation in the responses of the surviving banks based on their own financial condition. To do this, we employ a method similar to that utilized by Smith, Bradley, and Jarrell (1986) . We expand Equation (1′) to include a number of conditioning variables that reflect the financial strength of each bank and two bank control variables, i.e.,
where k is the [0, ϩ1] event window for each event e; COND i is a variable that describes the financial condition of bank i at the time of the event, TA i is the log of total assets for bank i at the time of the event and controls for bank size, and SH i controls for the exposure of bank i to the failed institution through equity investments. 8, 9 This specification implicitly models the abnormal returns, γ i , estimated in Equation (1′) as
To maximize the extraction of information, the coefficients for the market index in Equation (2) are allowed to be bank specific as the index is constant across banks, while the coefficients for the financial condition and control variables are restricted to be equal across all banks, as the values of these variables vary across individual banks. We estimate Equation (2) by generalized least squares in one step, instead of two, because it allows us to directly examine the correlation between abnormal returns and individual bank financial condition while maintaining the general structure for the covariance matrix of the residuals.
The financial condition of banks at each event date is captured by five descriptive variables: (1) the ratio of reported loan loss reserves to total book value of equity capital (LLR); (2) the ratio of nonperforming loans to total book value of equity capital (NPL) 10 ; (3) the ratio of domestic loans to firms in the construction industry, real estate, and finance and insurance (which are typically assumed to be riskier than other loans) to total domestic loans (RISKY); 4) Moody's Bank Financial Strength Rating (RATING), which is a measure of a bank's intrinsic or "standalone" safety and soundness without government or third party assistance; and 5) the ratio of book-value equity to total assets (CAPITAL). 11 Banks with higher ratios of LLR, NPL, RISKY and lower CAPITAL ratios are assumed to be in weaker financial condition. The variable RATING is a linear cardinal measure of Moody's Bank Financial Strength Rating and was constructed so that banks with lower ratings have a higher value of the measure. Equation (2) is estimated separately for each of the five measures of COND to minimize multicollinearity problems.
If the failure events revealed adverse news, the abnormal returns-γ i -of banks in weaker (stronger) financial condition would be relatively more negative (positive). If the events represented good news for the surviving banks and shareholders differentiated across banks, the returns of weaker banks would have responded less positively to the events. On the other hand, if shareholders responded to the failure but did not differentiate among banks of different financial strength, there would be no statistical relationship between COND and abnormal returns. To explore these possibilities, we test the hypothesis If the shareholder response at bank i depended on the fraction of bank i's assets that was invested in the failed institution, then we would expect the coefficient on SH i , θ, to be significantly negative. On the other hand, if shareholders did not take this exposure into account, then θ would be statistically indistinguishable from zero.
DATA
The announcement dates of the six failures were obtained through a search of the Wall Street Journal, Reuters news wire, Newscast news service, and the Knight Ridder business wire. These include news articles from Japanese and other international news sources. All dates are Japanese dates. If the failure announcement was made during a trading day in Japan, that date is used as the event day [0] . If an announcement was made after the market was closed or over the weekend, we use the next trading date as event date. 12 For the Long-Term Credit Bank we used the date of the first news stories that cited official government sources that the bank was in imminent danger of being nationalized.
Daily stock prices and returns for our initial sample of 115 publicly traded banks were obtained from the University of Rhode Island's Pacific Basin Capital Markets Research Center (PACAP) 1998 database for 1994 through 1997. Unfortunately, these data were not available for examining the 1998 failures, and we used data obtained from Bloomberg instead.
13 Market returns are measured by the TOPIX index, which includes seasoned shares of over 1000 major companies including both banks and nonbanks (First Section) traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, from PACAP for the first four events and from Bloomberg for the last two events in 1998. The data on the financial condition of individual banks were obtained from the December 1997, September 1998, and February 1999 disks of the Fitch-IBCA's Bankscope database. The data on the major shareholders of the failed institutions were collected from various issues of the Japan Company Handbook.
For our procedures, estimation of Equations (1′) and (2) requires a balanced panel and stock price data for each bank in the sample. However, stock price data for each day in the estimation period and data on all five financial condition variables were not available for all of the maximum 115 banks in either the PACAP or Bloomberg data sets. This requirement reduced the number of banks that could be analyzed. The final sample in each estimation period included only banks for which daily stock price data were not missing for more than five consecutive trading days. Returns missing for less than five consecutive days were simulated from the market model, estimated over a 186 trading day period before each event. In addition, the sample was restricted to banks for which data were available for at least one of the financial variables. The final sample has 79 surviving banks in 1995, 76 banks in 1997, and 80 banks in 1998. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The Performance of the Failed Institutions prior to Their Failure
Could market participants anticipate the failures based on the performance and financial condition of the failed institutions just prior to their failure? Table 1 compares the financial condition and performance of three of the four failed banks and the two securities firms to the surviving institutions for which accounting data were available using data published in their last full-year financial statements. The financial statements of Hyogo Bank were not available. The table also reports the ratio of the rank of each failed institution to the worst ranking of any bank in the sample.
It is apparent that the failed banks had much lower reported earnings and asset quality than the surviving banks had. For instance, only 26 out of 118 banks for which accounting data were available had lower returns on equity than Hokkaido Takushoku Bank did in the three years prior to its failure. Similarly, LTCB and NCB were in the bottom quartile of the sample in terms of returns on assets and equity. In fact, NCB had the lowest return on equity of all banks. The failed banks did not fare better with respect to asset quality. There were only three banks that had higher nonperforming loans relative capital than Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and LTCB had, and NCB had the highest ratio of risky loans. In all these cases, the differences in ratios between the failed and surviving banks are statistically significant at the 5% level. The reported capital ratios of the failed banks were close to the average ratios, however. In retrospect, this reflects a dramatic under-reserving for losses from loans and other investments, despite the fact that these banks had higher loan loss reserves. Notes: Risky loans are defined as loans to the real estate, finance, and construction sectors, and the Moody's BFSR ratings are a cardinal measure where high values denote lower ratings. In the rows labeled "rank," the first number indicates the ranking of the failed institution and the second number indicates the number of peer institutions (both failed and surviving) in the sample. The "big three" securities firms are Nomura Securities, Nikko Securities, and Daiwa Securities.
In contrast, the performance ratios of the two failed securities firms were not significantly different from those of their surviving counterparts. However, Sanyo Securities had a lower capital ratio and Yamaichi Securities had both a lower capital ratio and lower earnings than those of its competitors.
The credit ratings of banks at the time of their failure also revealed their relatively weak financial condition. At the time of its failure, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank had a Moody's Investors Service Financial Strength rating of E, indicating that the bank possesses "weak intrinsic financial strength, requiring periodic outside support or suggesting an eventual need of outside assistance." This compared with an average rating of D for all the other banks, which indicates that these banks "possess adequate financial strength, but may be limited by one or more of the following factors: a vulnerable or developing business franchise; weak financial fundamentals; or an unstable operating environment." (Moody's Investors Service 2000). Similarly, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank each had ratings of E, while the average rating for the surviving banks at that time was C.
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Although Table 1 highlights the weak financial condition of the failed banks relative to the average surviving bank, the three that failed were not the weakest ones. A number of surviving banks were in worse reported financial condition at the time of each failure, even by the optimistic accounting conventions of the time. The fact that regulators closed these firms rather than the worse performers suggests that they did not have a specific consistent closure rule and may reflect regulatory discretion.
Was the relatively weak condition of the failed institutions reflected in their own stock market performance prior to failure? It appears yes. Figures 1A through 1F plot the market-adjusted cumulative daily returns (return of the institution minus the return on the value-weighted index of all stocks in the Tokyo Stock Exchange) for the failed institutions and a portfolio of the surviving institutions in the period leading up to the failure announcements. Except for LTCB and NCB, whose shares ceased to trade upon their nationalization, the shares of the remaining four institutions continued to trade for some time after their legal failure, and their market-adjusted cumulative returns are also shown after their failure announcements. With the exception of Nippon Credit Bank, the market-adjusted cumulative returns of the failed banks drifted into and stayed in negative territory before failure, while the cumulative returns of their peers fluctuated around zero. Negative drift in the cumulative returns of the failed securities firms is also evident. However, there is a noticeable downward drift in the cumulative returns of surviving securities firms, albeit not as large as those of the two that failed. Surprisingly, in the days leading up to its nationalization, Nippon Credit Bank earned higher returns than the market portfolio and the surviving banks despite its well-recognized difficulties and large loan losses.
Performance of Failed Institutions to Their Own Failure Announcement
Another indicator of the extent to which the market anticipated the failures is the responses of the shareholders of the four institutions-two banks and two securities firms-whose stock continued to trade after their legal failure, to the announcement Fig. 1 The cumulative market-adjusted daily stock returns of the failed and surviving institutions. This figure plots the cumulative market-adjusted returns of the failed institutions and of their surviving competitors over the sample period. The cumulative market adjusted returns of the failed institution i on date t are calculated as
where R iτ is the failed institution's daily stock return on date τ ≤ t, R mτ is the daily market return as measured by the TOPIX index, and t 0 is the first day of the sample period. The cumulative returns of surviving institutions are calculated similarly and are averaged across institutions. Hence, the average market-adjusted cumulative returns of the surviving institutions are defined as (1րN)͚ of their own failure. Table 2 shows the average market-adjusted returns of the four institutions on the first two days of trading after the failure announcements. All four institutions showed significantly negative reactions to their own failure on the day of failure. This suggests the four events do not appear to have been fully anticipated by their shareholders. Table 3 provides test statistics for three hypotheses for all six failure events: (1) that the event parameter γ ik is jointly equal to zero for each bank; (2) that the event parameters γ ik are equal across all banks in the sample; and (3) that 50% of the banks in the sample have positive abnormal returns on and around each of the six failure events. The table also shows the estimated median abnormal returns for our sample portfolio of surviving banks.
Abnormal Returns of Surviving Banks
The first column of Table 3 reports the results for the estimated abnormal returns of individual banks for day [0] of each event window, computed for the 76 to 80 banks for which daily stock price was either available or simulated for each estimation period. The second column reports the estimates for day [ϩ1] of the event window, and the third column reports the results for the [0, ϩ1] window. 16 The statistics beneath the rows labeled "H 1 0 : γ 1 ϭ … ϭ γ N ϭ 0" report chi-squared and F-statistic tests for the hypothesis that the abnormal returns for each bank jointly equal zero. On the event day [0], five of the six failures had statistically significant test statistics, suggesting that we can reject this hypothesis for these failure announcements. One day after the failure announcements, four of the six failures had statistically significant test statistics. For the [0, ϩ1] event window, we can reject the hypothesis for Notes: The stock returns of the institutions are adjusted for the aggregate market movements by subtracting daily returns on the Tokyo Stock Exchange market index (TOPIX) from the daily returns of the financial institutions. Due to trading halts for the shares of the failed institutions after the announcements, the reported "Event" dates are the first two days in which the shares of each institution traded and differ from the event dates used in the remainder of the paper. Test statistics were calculated using standard errors that were corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The results in Table 3 also indicate that the median abnormal return for surviving banks on the event day (day [0]) were mostly negative. Of the six median returns on the event day, five were negative. Only the median return for the announcement of the nationalization of NCB was positive. The median abnormal returns on the day following the announcements [ϩ1] and over the [0, ϩ1] window indicate that the impact from the failure announcements was equally strong over these event windows. Of the median returns for day [ϩ1], five were negative, and all six median abnormal returns for the event window [0, ϩ1] were negative.
To determine whether banks with negative abnormal returns statistically outnumbered those with positive returns, we computed the proportion of positive abnormal returns minus 0.5 divided by the standard deviation of a binomial distribution (the "sign test"). On event days [0] and [ϩ1], the sign test indicates that the number of banks with negative abnormal returns exceeded those with positive returns in 10 of the 12 cases, although statistically significantly so in only five. For the [0, ϩ1] window, the sign test indicates more negative average abnormal returns in six cases and statistically significantly so in five. These results are consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis. The sign test for the failure of Nippon Credit Bank alone indicates that positive abnormal returns outnumbered negative returns, which is consistent with the positive revaluation hypothesis.
Responses to Failure Announcements by Bank Type and Shareholdings
in Failed Institutions Next, we investigate potential sources of the observed differences in the responses of the surviving banks' shareholders. As discussed earlier, these differences could, in part, be due to differences in the surviving banks' equity exposure to the failed institutions. To investigate this possibility, we calculated abnormal returns for an equally weighed portfolio of banks that were shareholders in the failed institutions and compared them with the equally weighed average abnormal returns of nonshareholder banks for each event. Table 4 shows the test results for the hypothesis that the average response of banks that were shareholders in the failed institution was equal to the average response of non-shareholder banks. The results indicate that the surviving banks that were shareholders in the failed institutions were more adversely affected by the failure announcements than were non-shareholder banks in 12 of the 18 (6 institutions times 3 windows) event windows examined. However, the differences between the returns of shareholder and non-shareholder banks were statistically significant in only three of the six failures-Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Nippon Credit Bank. The lack of significant differences between shareholder and non-shareholder portfolios in the other three cases may reflect differences in exposure. We investigate this more carefully by dividing the responses of the shareholder institutions into the proportion of the total responses that may be attributable to the decline in the value of their investment portfolio in the failed institutions and the proportion due to contagion. To do so, we computed the change in the market value of the institution's investment in the failed institutions and subtracted it from the total change in the stock market value of the surviving investor bank. Because the stock prices of some of the failed institutions were not reported on both the day of and one day after the event, we computed the threeday holding period return for each shareholder bank net of change in the value of the bank's investment in the failing institution ending two days after the event.
Eight of the 10 banks that were shareholders in one or more of the three 1997 failures experienced negative adjusted returns around the failure dates as did six of the nine shareholder banks around the two 1998 failures. Banks that were investors in more than one failed institution were treated as separate banks for each failure. Thus, banks that had invested in the failed institutions were more severely impacted even after adjusting for their investment losses. Table 4 also presents tests of the hypothesis that the average responses of city, long-term credit, regional, and trust banks were equal in pairwise comparisons.
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The results indicate no obvious patterns. Only in the case of Sanyo Securities, larger banks, whose activities overlapped with those of securities firms, had more negative returns than regional banks had. However, there is not an equally strong difference across bank types for the failure of Yamaichi Securities.
Abnormal Returns and the Characteristics of the Surviving Banks
Because, although generally negative, the responses of individual banks to the failure announcements differ in magnitude, we explore whether the responses were related to the financial characteristics of the associated individual banks. First, we correlated for each failure the daily total returns of the failed and each surviving institution for one year ending 60 trading days prior to failure to see whether the market perceived these banks as similarly situated financially. We divided the resulting correlation coefficients into quartiles and tested for significant difference between the abnormal returns in the top (highest correlation) and bottom quartiles. Although, as expected, the abnormal returns were more negative in the highest quartile in five of the six failures, they were statistically significantly so in only three of the six failures. 18 In addition, we examined the abnormal returns by the institutions' marketto-book capital ratios on the assumption that institutions with lower market ratios would be more adversely affected by the failures. As above, these results were grouped by quartiles according to the market-to-book capital ratios. In four of the six failures, the institutions with the lowest market-to-book ratios experienced the largest negative abnormal returns. This suggests that individual risk characteristics of the individual institutions are likely to determine the magnitude of the response. Accordingly, we regressed the individual banks' abnormal returns over the [0, ϩ1] window on measures of the respective bank's financial strength, as modeled in Equation (2). The results are reported in Table 5 .
A defining characteristic of the six failures was a sharp increase in the extent of problem assets revealed at the time of their failure announcements. The release of this information might have caused the shareholders of surviving banks to reassess the extent of problem assets at their own institutions, and the banks with risky loan portfolios might have suffered more adverse effects. The failures might also have Notes: Each model also includes unreported, bank-specific coefficients for the market model and average industry abnormal returns for each announcement. Standard errors of the coefficient estimates for the condition variable, Log TA, and SH are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
signaled a regulatory shift to increased probability of closure in the future, particularly for the riskier banks. In either of these cases, we would expect banks with higher loan loss reserves, nonperforming loans, or loans to risky sectors to be more adversely affected by the failures than the other banks were. In addition, the failures may be expected to affect banks with lower capital ratios and Moody's debt ratings more adversely. The results in Table 5 indicate that this was generally the case. In all six of the failures, abnormal returns of banks were inversely related to the ratio of loan loss reserves to equity capital. However, this relationship was statistically significant only for the failures of Hyogo Bank and Yamaichi Securities. In five of the failures, the abnormal returns of surviving banks were more negative for banks with higher ratios of nonperforming loans to equity capital and statistically significant for three of the failures. Similarly, surviving banks with greater loan exposures to the riskier real estate, construction, and finance and insurance sectors were more adversely affected by all six failures and significantly so by two of the failures.
In five of the six failures, banks with higher credit ratings were affected less adversely by the failure announcements than were other banks. This relationship was statistically significant for four of the six cases. Similarly, in all six failures, banks with larger equity cushions suffered less from the failure announcements than other banks did, although the differences were significant for only two failures.
The statistically significant coefficients in the expected directions obtained for the accounting variables is particularly interesting because it was widely recognized that, over our sample period, these variables greatly understated the true deterioration in the financial condition of Japanese banks. Our results suggest that shareholders of Japanese banks were, nevertheless, able to extract the information contained in these accounting measures to assess the relative impact of adverse news on individual banks. It appears likely that stronger results would have been obtained with more accurate reported data.
The significant negative effect of risky loans is consistent with the relationships found by Peek and Rosengren (2001) and Hoshi (2000) . Peek and Rosengren provide evidence that financially weaker Japanese banks expanded their lending more than stronger banks did during the 1992-1998 period and that the largest increases occurred in the risky real estate sector. Hoshi (2000) provides evidence that banks that had expanded their loans to risky sectors most aggressively over the [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period had significantly higher problem loans in March 1999.
The above results in Table 5 strongly suggest that financially weaker banks were affected more adversely by the failure announcements. Of the 30 estimated coefficients for the financial condition of surviving banks (five condition variables for each of the six events), 27, or 90%, have the expected signs and 13 are statistically significant. These results are consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis and inconsistent with the pure contagion hypothesis. The failure announcements appear to have generated new information about asset quality at surviving Japanese banks and/or signaled changes in regulatory closure policy that affected financially weaker banks more adversely than they did stronger banks.
The coefficients on bank size are significant for only two of the six failures, Hyogo Bank and Yamaichi Securities. For example, shareholders of larger banks suffered less from the failure announcement of Hyogo Bank than did smaller banks. Because Hyogo Bank was a medium-sized regional bank, its operations were more similar to the operations of other relatively small regional banks than to the operations of larger banks.
The results in Table 4 suggest that the surviving banks that were shareholders in three of the failed institutions were more adversely affected by the failure announcements than were non-shareholder banks. Once we control for differences in financial condition and size of the banks in Table 5 , however, the relationship between banks' abnormal returns and their exposure to the failed institutions through equity ownership becomes weaker. This suggests that the financial condition variables and size were more important in explaining cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns among the surviving banks than was equity exposure.
We also related the holding period returns around each failure event for each surviving shareholder bank net of the change in the value of the respective bank's investment in the failing institution to five financial characteristics of both the bank and the surviving banks-the ratio of loan loss reserves to total book value of equity, the ratio of nonperforming loans to total book value of equity, the ratio of risky loans (defined as loans to real estate, construction, and finance sectors) to total domestic loans, the ratio of total book value of equity to total assets, and the cardinal measure of Moody's financial strength rating. The banks were divided into two groupsbanks that had negative adjusted share returns and those that had positive ones. We then compared the five financial risk characteristics of the shareholder banks in these two groups with the characteristics of the non-shareholder surviving banks.
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Banks that were shareholders in more than one failed institution were included only once each year. 20 For every characteristic, banks that had share price declines in excess of their investments in the 1997 and 1998 failed institutions had weaker financial condition than did other banks, although the differences are only statistically significant in the 1997 period. These results suggest that, after adjusting for investment in the failed institutions, most of the shareholder banks still had negative market-adjusted holding period returns and appear to have been in worse financial condition than other banks were.
Economic Significance
In addition to testing whether the differential responses of the banks to the failures are statistically significant, it is worthwhile to examine whether the differences are economically significant. In Table 6 , we report the estimated abnormal returns of surviving banks evaluated at different relative magnitudes of the COND variables: at the mean, median, 10th (highest) percentile, and 90th (lowest) percentile. To determine whether these differences are small or large relative to the banks' historical returns, Table 6 also reports the average daily returns of surviving banks over the one-year period before each event date. The results indicate that the impact of financial condition on the responses of banks' shareholders to the six failures was relatively large in all six events. For example, when Hyogo Bank failed, banks with loan loss reserves at the 10th percentile had an estimated abnormal return of Ϫ0.3083%. Banks with loan loss reserves in the 90th percentile suffered abnormal returns of Ϫ1.2076%, four times as large. The nearly 1% difference in the expected abnormal returns is particularly large compared with the average daily returns of Ϫ0.0257% prior to the failure announcement. We find similarly strong, if not stronger, results when we compare the variations in expected abnormal returns arising from changes in the other COND variables for the other failure announcements.
Another test for economic significance involves computing the total returns for each bank over both a two-day window starting on the event date and for the previous year and comparing these with the associated abnormal returns. These results are reported in Table 7 . In all cases, the abnormal returns are large relative to both the two-day total returns, ranging from Ϫ57% to 110% of the returns, and the average daily total return for the preceding year, ranging from 305% to 3625% lower than the previous one-year returns. This suggests that the failures had economically important consequences for investors in other Japanese institutions.
Robustness Tests
We conducted a number of robustness checks to ensure that our empirical results are not dependent on the sample of banks used, the length of the event windows used, Notes: COND variables are alternatively set equal to (1) the sample mean (MEAN); (2) the sample median (MEDIAN); (3) the 10th percentile value of the sample distribution (P10); and (4) the 90th percentile value of the distribution (P90). As a comparison, the table also shows the average daily returns of surviving banks over the sample period prior to each failure. When there are multiple failures during the sample period, the average daily returns are calculated for the period prior to the first failure. or the definitions of the condition and control variables. These are summarized in Appendix B. Overall, the results reported in the appendix using a sequentially smaller sample of banks, wider event windows, and different condition variables (e.g., risk-weighted BIS capital ratios as an alternative to the book-value equity ratio) are qualitatively similar to those reported in this section.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the ability of Japanese stock market participants both to price the risk characteristics of the banks and to incorporate new information in bank share prices during the country's banking crisis in the mid-1990s. The responses of bank shareholders to the failure of four commercial banks and two security firms between 1995 and 1998 were analyzed. These failures were important events that signaled information that could reasonably be expected to affect the perceived risk environment of the surviving banks and trigger responses in their share prices. The results are of particular interest in light of the alleged opaqueness of bank data in Japan, the poor and uneven behavior of the regulators, and the severity of the banking crisis in this period.
We analyzed the impact of the six failure announcements on the share returns of surviving banks in a multivariate framework and tested both the median response of all bank share returns to the failures and the responses of individual surviving banks. The empirical results suggest that the failures signaled an unexpected deterioration in the operating and regulatory environments by affecting the median equity returns of surviving banks adversely. However, not all banks were affected equally by the failures. While the shareholders of some banks interpreted the six events as good news, the shareholders of most banks experienced large negative responses. Moreover, the responses of shareholders at individual banks were not indiscriminate; they were related to the financial condition of the individual banks. Shareholders of banks in poor financial health, as reflected in higher ratios of loan loss reserves, nonperforming loans, risky loans, lower Moody's credit ratings, and lower capital ratios, experienced more negative reactions to the failures than did shareholders of banks in stronger financial condition. These results hold for economic as well as statistical significance and are robust and basically unchanged by modifications in sample size, event windows, or the definition of variables. This suggests that the market was, on the whole, able to differentiate among banks in its response to the failures, so that any contagion from the failures to other banks was rational and information-based. That is, the results are consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis for the industry as a whole and inconsistent with the pure contagion hypothesis for individual banks. However, the available data do not permit a differentiation among the three different reasons for the negative revaluation that were discussed in Section 1.
The evidence presented in the paper suggests that despite the alleged lack of transparency and large inefficiencies in the Japanese stock market, bank shareholders were able to incorporated new information relatively quickly and by magnitudes and in directions that would be predicted by theory and to differentiate among banks on the basis of their relative risk characteristics. Thus, it is likely that market monitoring and discipline can be used by bank regulators in Japan more extensively to supplement regulatory discipline to promote a safer and more efficient banking system.
APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF EVENT RESOLUTIONS
In this appendix, we describe the important events leading up to and following each of the six failure announcements, organized by their implications for (1) the revelation of previously undisclosed problems; (2) an apparent shift in the traditional support structure of troubled Japanese financial institutions by other financial institutions; and (3) change in regulatory policy toward quicker resolution of insolvency at Japanese financial institutions.
In each of the six failures examined in this paper, the extent of bad loans and valuation losses previously disclosed by the failed institutions had been significantly understated, concealing the extent of their problems. Two months prior to its collapse, Hyogo Bank had reported bad loans amounting to 2% of its loan portfolio. After its failure the Ministry of Finance reported that the bank's losses had actually totaled 56% of total loans (Allen 1995) . Similarly, while the reported total assets of Sanyo Securities had exceeded its liabilities by ¥54 billion at the end of March 1997, six months later, the securities firm was insolvent by ¥75 billion. The bad loans at Hokkaido Takushoku Bank were actually three times the amount stated in its last financial statement, and at the time of its failure, Yamaichi Securities revealed that it had ¥265 billion off-balance sheet losses, representing 14% of total assets, that were previously undisclosed. In September 1998, shortly after a Bank of Japan inspection gave LTCB a clean bill of health and indicated that the bank was solvent as of March 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) reported that the bank was insolvent when assets were valued at market value. Three months later, in December 1998, the FSA determined that NCB had also been insolvent as of March 31, 1998. 21 Thus, market participants could have been surprised about the true extent of the problems in these institutions and revised upward their estimates of the size of problem assets and other losses at surviving banks with similar operations.
Next, the six failures revealed a significant change in the institutional and support structure of Japanese financial institutions. Traditionally, weak or troubled institutions could previous rely on implicit and explicit government support, capital injections and new loans from financially or otherwise affiliated companies, or "rescue mergers" with a stronger firm. In five of the six failures, there were early attempts by the regulators to rescue the failed institutions through financial assistance from their healthy affiliated firms. However, in all five cases, relatively healthy firms were unwilling, or unable, to provide unlimited support to their affiliated insolvent or nearly insolvent institutions, which failed soon thereafter. If shareholders of institutions in weak financial condition were relying on support from their healthier affiliates, the failures could have signaled that such support might not be forthcoming in the future and reduce the share value of these banks.
Early in 1997, the major creditors of Sanyo Securities (primarily insurance companies) agreed to restructure the subordinated loans issued by the firm, allowing Sanyo to meet regulatory capital requirements. In addition, in October 1997, the firm's three major banks extended emergency loans to the firm to bolster its capital. Shortly thereafter, however, the insurance companies refused to further restructure the subordinated loans, and Sanyo Securities sought court protection from its creditors. Over the same period, a merger with Kokusai Securities, coordinated by the regulators, failed to materialize and Nomura Securities-a major Sanyo shareholderrefused the government request that it make an additional investment in Sanyo Securities.
The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed when its regulatory agency-arranged merger with Hokkaido Bank (another, smaller institution in the Hokkaido region in northern Japan) was abandoned because of a disagreement over the extent of problem loans at Hokkaido Takushoku Bank.
In the days immediately following Hokkaido Takushoku's failure on November 17, 1997, the Japanese financial markets experienced significant turbulence. Despite the large extent of liquidity provided to the markets by the Bank of Japan, domestic credit lines to weak companies by other financial institutions were reduced and share prices of financial institutions dropped significantly. Yamaichi Securities was among the institutions that suffered the most. Its share price dropped sharply, as indications mounted that it was facing a severe liquidity crisis. On November 20, Yamaichi Securities announced that it had asked Fuji Bank, its main creditor and close affiliate, to provide the necessary financial support to ease its liquidity needs and to recapitalize the company. However, it became apparent in the days following that Fuji was unwilling to provide this support, and the securities firm closed soon after.
There was also a regulator-sanctioned merger attempt to rescue Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan. Following two months of sharp declines in LTCB's share price, the bank announced on June 26, 1998 that it was in merger talks with Sumitomo Trust Bank, a trust bank in stronger financial condition. However, the president of Sumitomo Trust Bank made it clear that the merger would proceed only after an inspection of LTCB's assets. Sumitomo Trust would not assume the bad loans at LTCB's nonbank affiliates and expected government assistance to fund the merger. The merger announcement was not sufficient to bring a turnaround at the bank. In the following months, LTCB experienced several further downgrades of its debt and announced a major restructuring plan in August. Despite the strong encouragement of the regulators and the restructuring plans, it became evident that LTCB would not survive, and the resolution of its insolvency was closely linked to the passage of a bill in the Diet that allowed nationalization of banks. In October 1998, the merger with Sumitomo Trust Bank was abandoned and the LTCB was nationalized.
Similarly, after the Nippon Credit Bank announced that it had a significant extent of problem loans and that its earnings had deteriorated significantly in the previous six months, Chuo Trust and Banking Co. announced that it had abandoned its planned merger. A few days later, NCB was nationalized.
Lastly, the failures signaled a likely shift in Japanese insolvency resolution policy. Under the traditional Japanese convoy system, regulators would encourage strong banks to merge with the weak institutions in return for favorable regulatory treatment. Depositors and other creditors of the insolvent bank would suffer no losses, and in most instances shareholders would suffer only small losses and not be wiped out totally. In the six failures examined here, all deposits at banks and all customer balances at securities firms were protected. In addition, immediately after the failures, the Bank of Japan provided emergency loans to the failed banks to ensure smooth operations and liquidity. However, in all six cases, shareholders suffered large losses, as did the nondeposit creditors of Hyogo Bank and Sanyo Securities.
This represented a sharp departure from previous regulatory policy. Hyogo Bank defaulted on its subordinated loans from insurance companies, and some trust and long-term credit banks that had large credit and stock exposures to Hyogo Bank and its affiliates suffered losses. The bank shareholders of Hyogo Bank-e.g., Industrial Bank of Japan, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Nippon Credit Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and Sanwa Bank-were also asked by the regulators to forfeit ¥158 billion in capital and contribute to the capital of a newly formed bank (Midori Bank), which would take over Hyogo's operations. In April 1998, the Midori Bank also failed. Its assets were transferred to another bank when the problem loans from the Hyogo Bank it assumed generated greater than expected losses.
Sanyo Securities defaulted on its liabilities in the short-term money markets after it sought court protection from its creditors. Moreover, the three major creditors of the firm (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Daiwa Bank, and Nippon Credit Bank), which were also major shareholders, had to write off their large exposures to the firm, of which ¥9 billion was extended only a month before Sanyo's failure. In addition, the three banks and the largest shareholder of Sanyo Securities (Nomura Securities) had to contribute ¥25 billion to the Securities Deposit Compensation Fund to help protect Sanyo Securities' customers. After its attempts at restructuring failed, Sanyo Securities formally filed for bankruptcy on November 23, 1998.
Unlike the traditional convoy system, where the entire troubled institution would merge with a strong institution, the assets of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities were sold piecemeal or liquidated. The operations of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in Hokkaido region were transferred to the North Pacific Bank, and its operations outside of Hokkaido were eventually sold to Chuo Trust and Banking Co. However, only the good assets of the bank were transferred, and its bad loans were sold to the Deposit Insurance Company.
The postfailure operations of Yamaichi Securities were closed officially on March 31, 1998, after the company sold 30 branches and transferred 2000 employees to Merrill Lynch & Co., Japan. Yamaichi Securities liquidated the remainder of its assets in the following months. Because its liabilities exceeded its remaining assets by ¥22.51 billion, its ability to repay ¥43 billion in subordinated loans was cast in doubt.
The shareholders of the two banks that were nationalized also suffered losses at that time. For the most part, the losses to the shareholders of the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan had already occurred before the time of its nationalization (see Figure 1E) . The bank's share price, which had started the year at ¥210 had Significantly different from the response of regional banks at the 5% or better statistical level. Significantly different from the response of trust banks at the 5% or better statistical level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. eroded to ¥58 by June 25, 1998. By the time the bank was nationalized on October 23, 1998, its share price had declined to ¥2. Thereafter, the shares lost all value. After the nationalization, the good assets of the bank were eventually sold to a consortium led by Ripplewood Holdings LLC in the U.S., which paid ¥1 billion for the bank and injected an additional ¥120 billion in capital. The new bank also received ¥240 billion of public capital from the Financial Reconstruction Commission in March 2000.
In contrast to the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, the share price of Nippon Credit Bank increased from ¥114 at the beginning of 1998 to ¥158 the day before its failure ( Figure 1F ). When NCB was nationalized, its shareholders were wiped out and lost significant amounts.
The six failures also pointed to potentially stricter regulation and supervision of weak institutions. According to Hakuo Yanagisawa, Chairman of the Financial Reconstruction Commission, the nationalization of the two long-term credit banks demonstrated that "the bank regulatory environment in Japan has dramatically changed, and that the government will begin imposing rigorous standards on banks to try to win the confidence of financial markets" (Sugawara 1998) . Thus, the failures of the six institutions might have signaled a heightened risk of regulatory closure to shareholders of surviving banks and higher expected losses if these banks were closed. Standard errors of coefficient estimates for the condition variable, Log TA, and SH are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To ensure that our results are not dependent on the sample used, the length of the event windows, or the definitions of the condition and control variables, we conducted a number of robustness checks. To check whether our results are robust to alternative samples, we restricted our samples to banks with no missing stock price data in the PACAP database throughout each estimation period, so that no return data had to be simulated. This reduces the number of banks in each sample significantly. We then replicated the analysis in Tables 4 through 6. The results are reported in Tables B1 and B2 and do not vary significantly from those reported in Tables 4 through 6 . Significantly different from the response of regional banks at the 5% or better statistical level. Significantly different from the response of trust banks at the 5% or better statistical level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tables B3  and B4 . Our earlier qualitative result that shareholders respond adversely to the failure announcements but that the effect is smaller for banks in stronger financial condition continues to hold.
We also reestimated our models for the failures in 1998 using the actual day of LTCB's nationalization (October 23, 1998) rather than the date of the first rumors of nationalization (October 19, 1998 ) that we used. The results were similar to those reported in Tables 4 through 6. The only noteworthy difference was the significant positive coefficients on other banks' equity exposure to LTCB in the second stage of the analysis (higher equity exposure increasing rather than decreasing abnormal returns), which is difficult to explain.
Lastly, we replicated our analysis with alternative definitions of the COND and control variables, using the original samples. In Equation (2), we specified the riskweighted BIS capital ratios as an alternative to the ratio of book value of equity to total assets and replaced the definition of nonperforming loans, which was based on progressively broader definitions used by the Ministry of Finance through time, with the narrower definition in effect in 1995. In addition, we replaced the log of total assets in Equation (2) with two binary variables that identify regional and trust banks. This allows us to control for any operational and other differences among the major types of Japanese commercial banks. The results (not shown but available from the authors) again differ little from those reported in Section 5.
NOTES
1. See, for example, the recent papers by Brewer and Jackson (2000) and Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren (2000) . For reviews of the earlier literature, see Flannery (1998) and Kaufman (1994 Kaufman ( , 2000 .
2. Following the collapse of stock and land prices in the early 1990s, the Japanese banking system started to deteriorate significantly (Hoshi, 2000, Hoshi and Patrick, 2000) . By the late 1990s, many of the larger Japanese banks appeared to be market value insolvent and most of the others barely solvent. By 1998, nonperforming loans at all Japanese banks were estimated to be as high as $1 trillion or 20% of their on-balance sheet assets. Only liberal accounting treatment permitted most Japanese banks to satisfy the Basel capital standards. Moreover, at first conjectural and then explicit full government guarantees issued in 1996 permitted most major banks to continue to operate without depositor runs. Nevertheless, despite the favorable accounting treatment and government guarantees, Japanese financial institutions suffered severe liquidity problems during the sample period in the international interbank markets.
3. These six institutions and the circumstances surrounding their failures are described in detail in Appendix A. This is the second time that Yamaichi Securities Company encountered financial distress. In 1965, it experienced liquidity problems and received funding from the Bank of Japan (Daiwa Securities 2000).
4. We thank Eric Rosengren for suggesting these tests. 5. Because the events occurred on the same day for all the banks, it is likely that the residuals in the individual bank equations are correlated contemporaneously. Thus, we adjust for contemporaneous correlation. The methodology used in this article makes the standard assumptions that the residuals are independent and identically distributed within each equation and independent of the market return and the binary event variables; the noncontemporaneous correlation of residuals across banks is zero; and there is no event-induced heteroskedasticity. Thus, the covariance matrix of the residuals in Equation (1) has the following structure:
, where I is the identity matrix and N is the number of banks in the sample. 6. We also allowed the market model coefficients to shift after each event, but the inclusion of additional shift parameters did not alter the results significantly.
7. See Genay (1998) for a detailed discussion of the differences in the operations of city, regional, long-term credit, and trust banks.
8. SH i is defined as
where ρ i is the percent of outstanding shares of the failed institution j that was owned by bank i, TA j is the total assets of the failed institution j, and TA i is the total assets of the surviving bank i. 9. It might also be desirable to include information on overlapping markets, but that is difficult to obtain, particularly for the large national and regional banks that operate in many markets.
10. During our sample period, the regulatory definition of nonperforming loans was changed twice to be more inclusive and give a broader measure of bad loans. We use the extent of nonperforming loans as reported by the banks. Hence, the measure of nonperforming loans changes over time. However, since the changes are in effect for all banks and we estimate Equation (2) for each event separately, the change in definition through time should not affect our results. As a robustness check, we also estimated Equation (2) using the initial, narrower definition of nonperforming loans. The results were basically unchanged.
